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Abstract 
Although rural land rights are recognized in the 1995 Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), the academic discourse and policy 
dialogues on the issue are still underway. However, these dialogues do not 
comprehensively cover the provisions in the Constitution concerning rural land 
rights, the modus operandi in the drafting approaches of the provisions and their 
legal implications. Hence, by analyzing the different sections and articles of the 
Constitution, this article seeks to examine the extent to which rural land rights are 
defined in the Constitution and the legal implications of its constitutional 
recognition. This article examines the compatibility of the approach adopted by 
Ethiopian Constitution makers with the Trust and Distrust approaches propounded 
by Rosalind Dixon for drafting of constitutional provisions on rural land rights. 
Dixon‘s view is reviewed before considering it in relation with compatibility issues. 
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Introduction 
Most written Constitutions of nations are, inter alia, ―devoted to establishing 
and maintaining a system for the allocation (and reallocation) of power over 
wealth among individuals, groups and the state.‖1 Among others, this may be 
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done by recognizing the property rights clause in general without expressly 
dealing with land rights.2 In some countries, Constitutions do not express the 
recognition of property rights, let alone land rights specifically.3 In countries 
where there is constitutional recognition of property rights, the extent of 
specificity of the Constitution varies in dealing with property rights. There is 
variability in the manner property rights are regulated across constitutions. 
Depending on the general approach pursued by drafters of constitutions, a 
highly ―codified‖ or detailed approach to constitutional drafting may be used, or 
the drafters may rely on a more ―framework‖ style approach;4.  
It is uncommon to find a Constitution that specifically recognizes and defines 
actual property rights in land. Usually, constitutional laws either state the nature 
of ownership of land;5 or the types of land tenure systems adopted which may 
include the possibility of deprivation of land rights for public interest and 
defining the structure and power of land administration organ and tribunals;6 or 
setting social justice policy objectives revolving around land.7 However, 
Ethiopia's Constitution, after distinguishing the nature of land ownership 
adopted, i.e., ownership by the state and people,8 further grants actual rights to 
rural land specifically.9 Moreover, the Constitution goes to the extent of 
determining the manner of access to rural land rights10 and defines the nature of 
property rights in land.11 
                                           
2
 Gregory S. Alexander (2009), ―Property Rights‖, in Vikram David Amar and Mark V. 
Tushnet (eds), Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, New 
York, p. 59. 
3
 A case in point is the experience of Canada and New Zealand.  
4
 Rosalind Dixon (2015), ―Constitutional Drafting and Distrust‖, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law,  Vol. 13, Issue 4 (819–846), p. 820. 
5
 See for instance, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003 Revised in 2015, 
Official Gazette No. Special of 24/12/2015, Art. 35. 
6
 See for instance, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995), Art. 237-243. 
7
 See for instance, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), Constitution 
Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 – Government Notice 72 in Government Gazette 
36128, dated 1 February 2013. Commencement date: 23 August 2013 [Proc. No. R35, 
Gazette No. 36774, dated 22 August 2013, Art. 25(4/a), (5) and (6). 
8
 Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) (1995), Art. 40(3).  
9
 Montgomery Wary Witten (2007), ―The Protection of Land Rights in Ethiopia‖, Afrika 
Focus, Vol.20, No. 1-2, p. 155. 
10
 See FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(4) and (5) about peasants‘ and pastoralists‘ 
free access to rural land rights respectively and Art. 40(6) about private investors access to 
land rights through payment arrangements. 
11
 See Id Art. 40(5) about the pastoralists‘ property rights in land – use rights; Art. 40(3) in 
conjunction with Art. 35(7) about peasants‘ property rights in land – resembling to 
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The definition of the nature of property right in land (embodied in the 
Constitution) is not made in the same fashion to all rural landholders. The 
Constitution expressly grants use rights to pastoralists based on the communal 
holding nature of the land, whereas, it does not provide an explicit definition in 
the case of property rights (in land) of peasants and private investors. Rather, it 
leaves the nature of property rights in land held by peasants and investors to be 
understood through the canon of interpretation. This is inferred from the 
cumulative reading of the constitutionally-prohibited property rights in land, and 
the sections of the Constitution that deal with women‘s right and the state 
governments‘ power of taxation. 
The constitutional norm drafting approach adopted by the FDRE Constitution 
makers in drafting the provisions dealing with rural land rights is detailed or 
codified. This is inferred by making a comparison with the constitutional norms 
of other countries on the same issue and reference to the debates in the making 
of the Constitution.  
The existence or nonexistence of constitutional deferral through ‗by law 
clause‘ or adoption of abstract or vague concepts in a constitution is not by itself 
sufficient to classify the drafting approach followed in constitution making into 
‗framework-style‘ approach or detailed or codified approach.12 
Rosalind Dixon suggests that the adoption of a particular constitution 
drafting approach depends on ―the perceived congruence between the 
constitution makers‘ aims and the constitution interpreters‘ understandings 
thereby giving rise to the dichotomy of trust-mistrust approaches.‖ In her view, 
constitution drafters adopt a detailed or codified approach in constitutional 
norms drafting because ―they to some degree distrust the constitution 
interpreters –judges in the supreme or constitutional courts, as they may not 
share the aims and understandings of constitution drafters.‖ In yet another 
approach the legislature resorts to framework-style constitutional norm drafting 
when they ―highly trust and has faith in the constitutional judges as partners in 
the process of constitutional design‖.13  
It is to be noted that the constitutional recognition of rural land rights 
under the FDRE Constitution has legal implications on different legal 
                                                                                                            
usufruct rights; and also, Art. 97(2) about private investors and urban land holder property 
rights in land - usufruct rights. 
12
 See Rosalind Dixon (2011), ―Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative 
Perspective‖, in Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg (eds.), Comparative Constitutional 
Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham; wherein the claim is made that the 
constitutional drafting approach adopted in a given constitution making can be determined 
on the basis of the existence and non-existence of constitutional deferral in the 
constitution.  
13
 R. Dixon, supra note 4.   
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concepts. Particularly, it has a legally constraining effect in terms of 
imposing a duty on the government, restricting legislative power, restraining 
the amendments to the land policy and raising the constitutionality issue of 
other legislation and act of the government. These two broad classifications of 
approaches consider the role players for interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions as the Courts of Law. In Ethiopia, the interpreter is the House of 
Federation, the second house/chamber of the federal government, which gives a 
different perspective altogether.  
The constitutional recognition of rural land rights under the FDRE 
Constitution has its legal implications on different legal concepts. Particularly, it 
has a legally constraining effect in terms of imposing a duty on the government, 
restricting legislative power, restraining the amendments to the land policy and 
raising the constitutionality issue of other legislation and act of the government. 
The first three sections of this article examine the rural land right issues 
regulated under the FDRE Constitution. This includes access to land, the scope 
of property rights in rural land, and protections afforded to land rights. In order 
to determine the approach of constitutional drafting adopted in the making of 
a given constitution, one has to make in-depth analysis of the level of details 
and scope in the constitutional regulation of a particular legal issue.  
Thus, the manner in which access to land is defined in the Constitution 
and the practical implications thereof –given the limited nature of land as 
object of property right– are reviewed. The approacch pursued in the 
Constitution in defining rural land rights is also examined in view of its 
effect in delimiting the power of the legislative organ in defining the 
property rights in land in its legislation. This approach is also examined in 
relation with clarity in  the protection against deprivation of property rights 
in land and the conformity of other  legislation with this constitutional 
stipulation. 
The common practice in constitutional laws is to recognize property rights in 
general14 rather than expressly dealing of land rights. Contrary to this, the FDRE 
Constitution specifically deals with the issue of rural land rights and the general 
notion of property rights.15 The recognition of land rights in the FDRE 
Constitution mainly embraces three socio-economic and legal issues, i.e., the 
                                           
14
 In fact, there are some constitutions which have not expressly recognised the right to 
property. A good instance is the constitution of Canada and New Zealand. Constitutions 
that recognise the right to property vary in terms of providing detailed rules. However, 
what is common to them is that they forbid arbitrarily deprivation of property rights and 
provide room for deprivation of property rights for greater societal interest. 
15
 See the FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(1 - 8), Art. 35(7) and Art. 97(2). 
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mechanism of access to land, the scope of property rights in the land of 
landholders and the features of deprivation of land rights. These themes are 
examined in the first three sections of this article.   
The fourth section of the article explores the general essence of the 
approaches of constitutional drafting, the approach adopted in the drafting of 
rural land rights norms under the FDRE Constitution and its compatibility with 
the nature of the organ entrusted with the power of constitutional interpretation. 
Section 5 analyses the implications of the constitutional recognition of rural land 
rights on the basis of three important legal issues. These issues relate to: (i) 
restriction to the legislative power, (ii) the obligation of the government to 
realize land rights, the nature of land policy visa-vise amendment of the 
constitution, and (iii) the constitutionality of other land legislation. The last 
section offers a brief conclusion about the potential amendment of the land right 
provisions in the FDRE Constitution to enable them to be compatible with the 
needs for periodic changes in land policy and optimal trust-based approach to 
constitution drafting. The article adopts a doctrinal research method. It mainly 
focuses on identifying, analyzing and synthesizing the constitutional and other 
legislation provisions.  
1. Access to Rural Land under FDRE Constitution 
One of the legal issues revolving around land rights that are regulated in the 
Ethiopian Constitution is the mechanism of land acquisition. Access to land is 
―an important issue for the majority of Ethiopian people who depend on 
agricultural production for their income and subsistence‖.16 That is why the 
proverb in the many languages of the country has it that ‗to be landless is to be 
sub-human‘ to show that for Ethiopians land is central to life.17 For example, the 
preamble of Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation enacted in 1975 
during the Dergue regime18  recognized the centrality of land in the economic, 
social and political lives of Ethiopians stating that ―…a person's right, honor, 
status and standard of living is determined by his relation to the land…‖19  
Articles 40(4) and 40(5) of the FDRE Constitution respectively entitle the 
Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists with the right to access to rural lands for 
                                           
16
 Samuel Gebreselassie (2006), ―Land, Land Policy and Smallholder Agriculture in 
Ethiopia: Options and Scenarios‖, (Paper prepared for the Future Agricultures Consortium 
meeting at the Institute of Development Studies, 20-22 March 2006), p. 3. 
17
 Paul Brietzke (1976), ―Land Reform in Revolutionary Ethiopia‖, The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 638. 
18
Amharic for ‗council‘ or ‗committee‘ and it is the socialist regime that governed Ethiopia 
in the year between 1974 -1991.  
19
 See the preamble of the Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation No. 31/1975. 
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free.20 These provisions provide peasants and pastoralists access to rural land 
without any payment, and they oblige the government to grant the same. On the 
other hand, investors can be entitled to rural land rights on the basis of payment 
arrangement which is established by law.21 
The constitutional right of peasants‘ and pastoralists‘ to free access to rural 
land rights evokes the question whether the rural land use payment imposed on 
the peasants‘ especially by subsidiary legislation is constitutional. Most regional 
states in Ethiopia have enacted laws that levy rural land use payment on 
peasants and not on pastoralists.22 One may argue that this is constitutional 
based on Article 97(2) of the FDRE Constitution, which states that ‗States shall 
determine and collect fees for land usufructuary rights‘.23  This claim may not 
be sound for two reasons. First, Article 40(4) of the Constitution clearly states 
that ―Ethiopian peasants shall have the right to obtain land without payment …‖ 
and Article 40(5) enshrines the rights of pastoralists to ―the right for free land 
for grazing‖. Such free access to rural land rights to peasants and pastoralists 
differs from the duty for payment of land use fees by investors in return to their 
entitlement to ―land usufructuary rights‘ stated under Article 97(2). Secondly, 
Article 40(6) of the Constitution  expressly states the rights of investors ―to the 
use of land  on the basis of payment arrangements.24  
The other important issue here is the purpose for which peasants and 
pastoralists acquire rural land rights for free. Article 40(4) of the Constitution, 
does not determine the purpose to which the land obtained by peasants without 
payment will be employed, i.e. whether they can use rural land for agriculture or 
other economic activities like that of investors. With regard to pastoralists, 
however, Article 40(5) of the Constitution clearly determines the purpose of 
land use, i.e., –grazing and cultivation. 
The failure of the Constitution to specify the purpose of free allotment of 
land to  peasants while determining the same regarding the pastoralists raises the 
question whether peasants are entitled to use rural land (which they have 
obtained without payment) for any purpose. One may also question the 
constitutionality of the rural land laws in specifying the purpose thereof. 
There can be two lines of arguments. On one side, it may be argued that the 
FDRE Constitution aims at allocating rural land to peasants for free for any 
                                           
20
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8. 
21
Id at Art. 40(6). 
22
 See for instance, the Oromia National State‘s Revised Rural Land Use Payment and 
Agricultural Income Tax Proclamation No.131/2007 Art. 3. Most of the States have 
enacted this type of law that levies rural land use payment. 
23
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 97(2). 
24
Id, at Art. 40(6). 
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purpose. Thus, the restriction imposed by another legislation on the purpose to 
which the land is freely given to peasants for agriculture purpose is 
unconstitutional.25 This argument may be justified first by the silence of the 
Constitution because, as stated earlier, Article 40(4) of the FDRE Constitution 
remains silent about the purpose for which land is intended to be provided to 
peasants for free. At the same time, Article 40(5) fixes the purpose –grazing and 
cultivation– to which pastoralists are expected to obtain land. Along this line of 
argument, one may argue that the Constitution rightly and intentionally makes 
this distinction among the peasants and pastoralists.  
The proponents of this line of interpretation may further rationalize this 
argument based on the manner of land utilization by peasants and pastoralists. In 
the case of pastoralists, utilization of land is done communally by a group of 
individuals; and unless the purpose to which the land to be utilized is 
predetermined, it will cause conflict among the members since each of the 
members may have a competing purpose to which they prefer to utilize the land. 
Thus, the Constitution‘s specification of the purpose for which land is to be 
allocated to pastoralists for free may be assumed to be purposeful. In the context 
of peasants‘, however, the utilization of land is individual thereby implying that 
the silence of the FDRE Constitution is meant to avoid limitation on the purpose 
of free allocation of land to peasants.26 
This line of argument can further raise social equity justification in ensuring 
access for the needy to provide them with the means to make a living27 without 
restricting the land use of peasants solely to agriculture. This view can be 
substantiated by the stipulation made in various laws regarding the nature of the 
purpose for which land can be used by an investor or another peasant who has 
rented rural land from peasants. In rural land laws enacted at federal and 
regional state levels, peasants have the right to rent their land to investors or 
other fellow peasants.28 Moreover, the federal government‘s rural land law 
implies that the investor and peasants can use such land for agriculture or any 
development project. This inference can, for example, be made from 
Proclamation No. 456/2005 which provides that ―[p]easant farmers, semi-
                                           
25
 See the Federal Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005, 
Art. 5(1/a). The same stipulation is provided in almost all States rural land laws . The rural 
land laws expressly state that the peasants‘ free access to rural land is granted only if 
he/she intends to engage in agriculture as his/her livelihood. 
26
 This argument unduly presupposes that the communal use and administration is prone to 
conflict as though it has no customary system of administration. It also assumes that the 
private holdings and use of peasants have lesser vulnerability to conflict.  Moreover, the 
argument fails to consider communally used land among peasants. 
27
 See Wibke Crewett and Benedikt Korf (2008), ―Ethiopia: Reforming Land Tenure‖, 
Review of African Political Economy, No.116, p. 205. 
28
 See the Federal Proclamation No. 456/2005, Art. 8(1). 
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pastoralists and pastoralists who are given holding certificates can lease to other 
farmers or investors land from their holding of a size sufficient for the intended 
development…‖29 The phrase ‗intended development‘ is broad and includes 
economic activities which can include agriculture and other activities.  
The counter argument of the above line of interpretation is that the FDRE 
Constitution specifies the purpose for which rural land is allocated to peasants 
for free, and that the stipulation of agriculture in rural land laws to this effect is 
constitutional. This view may be based on the general spirit of Article 40 of the 
FDRE Constitution and the assumption of the Constitution makers. The 
Constitutional Assembly‘s minutes imply the assumption that the peasants 
would use land only for agricultural purpose. The first justification of this 
argument relies on the adoption of the term ‗peasants‘ in Article 40(4) of the 
Constitution. Accordingly, when the Constitution grants free access to land for 
peasants under this provision it etymologically presupposes the person‘s 
engagement in agriculture.  
This argument can be justified in light of the problem that rural land given to 
peasants for free can be freely transferred under the guise of a joint investment, 
while  private investors are (based on Article 40(6)) entitled to the right to use of 
land on the basis of payment arrangement. If rural land is given to peasants for 
free for any purpose, private investors may avoid payment arrangements in their 
use of land by accessing land through peasants in the pretext of joint 
investment,30 and this, reduces government revenue generated from investors. In 
fact, one may counter-argue that this form of abuse can be controlled because 
the government is empowered to approve and register the contract between an 
investor and a landholder.31 
The Constitutional Assembly‘s minutes of the deliberation regarding the 
form of land ownership implies that the makers assumed that the peasants would 
use land only for agricultural purpose. Particularly, the justifications (such as 
agricultural nature of the country‘s economy and the presence of huge 
uncultivated-land) that were raised in support of the status quo in land ownership 
assumed that the landholdings of peasants are only used for agriculture. 
According to this line of argument, the specification of the purpose for which 
land is given to pastoralists for free does not imply that peasants would be given 
rural land to be used for any purpose.  




 Investors can access rural land from individual peasants by way of rent. This is clearly 
mentioned in the rural land legislation. Thus, the reason mentioned here has no weight to 
justify the position taken. 
31
 The Federal Proclamation No. 456/2005, Art. 8(2).  
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To this author, the first view is sound and compatible with the country‘s 
pursuits toward economic transformation. Unless we consider the silence of the 
Constitution as entitlement of peasants to use their landholding for any purpose 
including agricultural cultivation, we can suggest an amendment of the 
Constitution to make it compatible with the country‘s economic policy toward 
industrialization and modernization of agriculture. The challenge in this regard 
relates to the stringent procedures of constitutional amendment.32 
In view the objective reality, there is the need to raise the question whether it 
is practical to implement the right of peasants and pastoralists to free access to 
land rights. This is impractical because forty-three percent of rural Ethiopians 
have no access to rural land.33 The limited nature of the rural land and the ever-
increasing rate of population growth have indeed exacerbated the problems 
because there cannot be comparable expansion of the size of arable land in the 
country.34 Thus, the policy of ―guaranteed free access to land‖ is not sustainable 
in an environment of rapid population growth, and modern farming which 
includes animal husbandry should be the main source of subsistence.35 
2. Scope of Rights in Rural Land under the FDRE Constitution 
The FDRE Constitution, uncommon to other constitutional norms,36 provides its 
own conception of property rights in general and the nature of property rights to 
                                           
32
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 105(1).  
33
 Peter J. Bodurtha et al (2011), ―Land Reform in Ethiopia; Recommendations for Reform‖, 
(Prepared for Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE)) available at 
http://ebookbrowse.com/bodurtha-land-reform-in-ethiopia-pdf-d203740328, retrieved on 
05/07/2012, p. 1. 
34
 See, for example, Dessalegn Rahmato (2004), Searching for Tenure Security? The Land 
System and New Policy Initiatives in Ethiopia (FSS Discussion Paper No.12), p.15 and 
see also World Bank (nd), ―Options for Strengthening Land Administration in Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia‖, Report No: 61631-ET, p. 17 for the current rural 
population.  
35
 Tesfaye Teklu (2005), Land scarcity, tenure change and public policy in the African case 
of Ethiopia: evidence on efficacy and unmet demands for land rights. (The third 
international conference on development studies in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, June 18-19, 
2005) p. 19; and see also Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate Change (ECSNCC) 
(2011), A Review and Analysis of Land Administration & Use Legislation and 
Applications of the Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia and the Four Regional States of 
Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray, p. 42. 
36
 There can be certain important textual differences among various constitutional property 
clauses. Nevertheless, the differences do not go to the extent of defining the concept of 
‗ownership‘ and ‗private property‘ and listing of the bundle of rights as it is done in the 
Constitution of Ethiopia. As Gregory S. Alexander noted, constitutional property clauses 
are not identical even though they can share certain common features such as the 
recognition of the state‘s power of property expropriation as limitation to property rights; 
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different landholders. It adopts the Hohfeldian ‗bundle of rights‘ approach in 
defining property rights.37 This is inferred from the elements it provides for the 
concept of private ownership and the provision regarding the rights on the 
permanent improvement made on land.  
According to Article 40(1) of the Constitution, ―private property ownership‖ 
is defined by listing the rights an owner has over a thing. It states that ―… [the 
right to ownership of private property] includes the right to acquire [possess in 
the Amharic version] and to use, and … to dispose of such property by sale or 
bequest or to transfer it otherwise.‖38 According to Article 40(7) of the FDRE 
Constitution:  
Every Ethiopian shall have the full right to the immovable property he builds 
and to the permanent improvements he brings about on the land by his labor 
or capital. This right shall include the right to alienate, to bequeath, and, 
where the right of use expires, to remove his property, transfer his title, or 
claim compensation for it. 
From this provision, it can be inferred that the property rights in the 
Constitution are understood in terms of the bundle of rights that a person has 
over objects of property. The other concept related to property rights defined in 
the Constitution is the concept of private property. The FDRE Constitution 
under Article40(2), defines private property as:  
any tangible or intangible product which has value and is produced by the 
labour, creativity, enterprise or capital of an individual citizen, associations ( 
the Amharic version requires the associations to be Ethiopian) which enjoy 
juridical personality under the law, or in appropriate circumstances, by 
communities specifically empowered by law to own property in common.39 
The FDRE Constitution equates ―private property‖ with a thing or 
asset/product seemingly having economic value. The drafters of the Constitution 
have unduly defined property as a thing/product since both concepts refer to two 
distinct things in legal sense. Bruce has noted their distinction as follows: 
… [P]roperty is not a thing, but a set of relationship between persons 
governing the use of things. This is particularly true for land law, which is 
concerned with various rights over and interests in land which of those a 
                                                                                                            
and placing restrictions on the state‘s power to expropriate property in the form of 
permitting the expropriation to be done only for ―public purposes‖ or for ―public use‖. 
37
 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1913), ―Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning”, Yale L. J. Vol. 23, p. 22. 
38
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(1). 
39
 Id., Art. 40(2). 
358                              MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 12, No.2                             December 2018 
 
 
person can enjoy over his land, which can be enjoyed over that land by his 
neighbour, and he can enjoy over his neighbour‘s land.40 
One may argue that, as the definition of ‗private property‘ currently stands in 
the FDRE Constitution, rural land right is not the property of peasants and 
pastoralists since they access it for free. This is because it is not an output or a 
product of the labor, creativity, enterprise or capital of peasants and pastoralists. 
This understanding, in effect, produces its own legal effect in relation the legal 
protection and tenure security against eviction discussed in the subsequent 
section.   
Apart from providing definitional clauses for the above two concepts related 
with property rights, the FDRE Constitution also determines the nature of the 
land ownership. Accordingly, Article 40(3) accords ownership to the state and 
people, prohibits transfer of land through sale or other means of exchange. 
However, the Constitution does not clearly and expressly define the nature of 
property rights in land –the bundle of rights accorded to the peasants, the 
pastoralists and investors lesser than the ownership rights (complete/full 
property rights). 
It does not mean that the Constitution totally leaves it to be determined by 
the legislation of the government as the ruling government may claim.41 This is 
because the Constitution (through fragmented provisions) attempts to delineate 
the nature of property rights in relation with rural land held by peasants, 
pastoralists and investors. One can argue that the constitutional definition of the 
nature of property right in land for these three bodies is not consistent.  
From a contrario sensu reading of Article 40(3) the Constitution, it can be 
argued that peasants have all the elements of the private ‗ownership‘ rights in 
land excluding the right to transfer through sale or means of exchange. Unlike 
peasants‘, the Constitution has a clear stipulation concerning the property rights 
in land of the pastoralists and investors. Accordingly, Article 40(5) of the 
Constitution clearly stipulates that the scope of property rights in land of 
pastoralists is the use right. The Constitution entitles pastoralists to use rural 
land for grazing and cultivation purpose. This is in fact based on the manner 
how pastoralists utilize land – communally. Therefore, letting them other 
property rights beyond the use right will lead conflict among them since it 
results in the creation of competing interests.  
                                           
40
 Bruce Ackerman (1977), Private Property and the Constitution, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London as cited in Daniel Chappelle (2006), Land Law, (7
th
 
ed), Pearson Education Ltd, London, p. 20 
41
 Brightman Gebremichael (2013), The Role of Ethiopian Rural Land Policy and Laws in 
Promoting the Land Tenure Security of Peasants: A Holistic Comparative Legal Analysis, 
(LL.M Thesis, Bahir Dar University, unpublished), p.86. 
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This intention of the Constitution drafters can be inferred from the debates 
made on the drafting of the Constitution regarding the ownership of land. 
Especially, the group arguing in support of the status quo of the land ownership 
and against privatization invoked the uniqueness of pastoral land tenure system. 
The group stated that even if they go for privatization, uniform private property 
rights to land across the country could not be realized owing to the unique 
contexts of pastoralists who are in a continuous seasonal mobility across 
multiple ecosystems in search of the seasonally varying water sources and 
pasture.42 We can thus infer that the drafters intended to differentiate the scope 
of property rights in land of peasants from pastoralists. Furthermore, it can be 
inferred from this that the drafters intended to give a broader property right in 
land to peasants.  
In the case of investors too, the Constitution to some extent mentions the 
nature of property rights in land they will have. This can be deduced from the 
cumulative reading the two provisions of the FDRE Constitution– Article 40(6) 
which deals with the manner of acquisition of land rights by investors and 
Article 97(2) which states the power of regional governments to determine and 
collect fees in the utilization of land. As per the discussion made in the section 
dealing with access to rural land in FDRE Constitution above, it has stated that 
investors could access rural land rights only in payment arrangement, So, when 
this provision states the phrase land usufructuary rights it in effect is defining 
the nature of property rights in land of investors.  
As the Constitution does not expressly delineate the scope of the property 
rights of peasants in land, this implies their entitlement to the right to exclude, 
the right to transfer (without undermining the restriction in the Constitution) and 
the right to possess and use. This view can also be substantiated with what is 
provided in the FDRE Constitution with regard to Women‘s rights. Article 35(7) 
of the FDRE Constitution that embodies women‘s right to property also gives a 
certain clue as to the nature of property rights of peasants in land. It states that: 
―…In particular, [women] have equal rights with men with respect to use, 
transfer, administration and control of land.‖43 
                                           
42
 The Ethiopian Constitutional Assembly Minutes. (Vol. 4, Nov. 23-29/1994, Addis 
Ababa). Deliberation on Article 40. (Amharic document, author‘s translation); and see 
also Belachew Mekuria (2009), ―Human Rights Approach to Land Rights in Ethiopia‖ in 
Murado Abdo (ed), ―Land Law and Policy in Ethiopia since 1991: Continuities and 
Changes‖, Ethiopian Business Law Series, Vol. III, p. 59. 
43
 See id, at Art. 35(7), Emphasis added. This provision can also apply for the determination 
of property rights in urban land other than those acquired for investments. For investors 
acquiring urban land, the nature of property rights in land is similar to their property rights 
in rural land. This is because Article 97(2) of the FDRE Constitution (that incidentally 
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This view can be justified based on the intention of the Constitution drafters 
that is inferred from their debates in the process of drafting various provisions of 
the Constitution including Article 40. One of the justifications provided during 
the arguments against private ownership of land was that such right to sell will 
induce the agrarian poor to sell land and migrate to the nearby towns, and it will 
have the effect of escalating unemployment since industrial and services sectors 
are unable to accommodate the influx of migrants.44 The Constitution thus aims 
at ensuring peasants to have all property rights in land other than the right to 
transfer through sale or other forms of exchange. 
3.  Protection against Deprivation of Rural Land Rights in the 
FDRE Constitution 
It is ―a universal conviction in comparative constitutional law that the purpose 
of constitutional property rights clause, in general, is to strike a balance between 
protection of the existing property rights and the promotion of public interest.‖45 
This balance involves forbidding arbitrary deprivation other than the exceptional 
cases of compulsory acquisition of individual or community property rights. To 
strike this balance, most constitutional laws list the conditions that must be 
satisfied in the process of expropriation, such as observance of due process of 
law, expropriation solely for public purpose, and payment of just 
compensation.46 These general rules of the constitutional laws are mutants 
mutandis applicable to the property rights in land. 
Viewed this way, the FDRE Constitution recognizes the right to property as a 
human and democratic right. Nonetheless, unlike other constitutions, it does not 
make an express rule against arbitrary deprivation of property rights; and the 
deprivation to be done based on law. It rather defines the government‘s power of 
expropriation to deprive this right when the private property is needed for public 
purpose upon payment of the commensurate amount of compensation.47 It is 
noted that the laws on expropriation define public purpose so wide that it can 
                                                                                                            
mentions the nature of property rights in land of investors) is general and does not make a 
reference to rural or urban land. 
44
 See supra note 42, the Ethiopian Constitutional Assembly Minutes; and B. Mekuria, p.59. 
Emphasis added. 
45
 Theunis Roux (2006), ―Property‖ in Stuart Woolman, Theunis Roux and Michael Bishop 
(.eds), Constitutional Law of South Africa, (2
nd
 ed), Juta & Co LTD, Cape Town, p. 46-2. 
46
 The constitutions vary in the extent of elaborating these concepts. (For details on this 
point see Brightman Gebremichael (2016), ―The Power of Land Expropriation in the 
Federation of Ethiopia: The Approach, Manner, Source and Implications‖, Bahir Dar 
University Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1).  
47
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(8). 
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also include land to be allocated for investment.48 Moreover, it does not 
incorporate the element of due process of law in the course of the expropriation 
proceedings.49  
The FDRE Constitution protects peasants and pastoralists against deprivation 
of rural land rights by granting them the right against eviction.50 This right, as 
part of constitutional property clause, however, is not extended to other rural 
landholders, like investors and does not apply to other objects of property on the 
land. Based on the definition of ‗private property under the ‘FDRE Constitution 
(discussed above), and the Constituion‘s provision on expropriation as an 
exceptional restriction to deprive ‗private property‘ , it may seem that the right 
peasants and pastoralists against eviction and displacement from their land is 
‗absolute‘ thereby rendering expropriation inapplicable. Such argument is not 
valid and their land rights can be deprived through expropriation.51 
The FDRE Constitution also introduces other grounds of deprivation of 
property rights in land in a general sense while defining the property rights in 
the permanent improvements made and things built on the land. The provision 
states that: 
… [full] right shall include the right to alienate, to bequeath, and, where the 
right of use expires (the Amharic version says ‘when the right of land uses 
terminates), to remove his property, transfer his title, or claim compensation 
for it.‖52 
The English version of this provision implies that the property rights in land 
of any landholder in Ethiopia will be deprived upon the expiration –coming to 
an end– of the land rights. This would happen when the land right is time-
bound. In such case, even the Constitution entitles the land rights holder to 
remove his property (i.e., things that can be removed), and transfer his title or 
claim compensation for it (when things are not removable without damage).53 
                                           
48
 See, for example, Muradu Abdo (2015), ―Reforming Ethiopia‘s Expropriation Law‖, 
Mizan Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (pp. 301-340).  http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v9i2.3 
49
 The due process of law includes the procedural rights such as the right to notice, the right 
to be heard and the right to appeal. But these elements of due process of law are highly 
limited in the Ethiopian law of land expropriation.  
50
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(4) & (5). 
51
 For details about these two dissenting views see Brightman Gebremichael (2016), ―Public 
Purpose as a Justification for Expropriation of Rural Land Rights in Ethiopia‖, Journal of 
African Law, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp.200-203.  
52
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(7). 
53
 Emphasis added. Under the urban land lease law of Ethiopia, the lessee is required to 
remove the property on the land when the lease term expires, and does not guarantee the 
leaseholder to transfer property on the land to the new landholder or even claim 
compensation for them. So, the law is unconstitutional in this regard. 
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The Amharic version of this provision employs the word ‗terminates‘ instead 
of ‗expires‘ and this broadens the grounds by which the land rights are lost in 
addition to the lapse of the duration and expropriation.54 One can argue that the 
Constitution does not foresee such mechanisms of depriving the land rights of 
peasants and pastoralists. Otherwise, their constitutional right against eviction 
and displacement becomes superfluous. 
The discussion in the preceding sections raises two issues. The first issue 
relates to the constitutional drafting approach in the 1995 FDRE Constitution 
along with some discussion on Dixon‘s categorization of detailed/codified 
versus framework approaches. Secondly, the legal implications of the drafting 
approach (used in Ethiopia‘s Constitution) should be examined. The subsequent 
two sections address these matters. 
4. The Nature of Drafting Approach adopted in the Rural Land 
Rights Clause of the FDRE Constitution  
The general approaches in constitutional lawmaking are the ‗framework-style‘ 
approach in which the constitutional provision embodies ―only quite general 
textual guidance as to the meaning or operation of particular constitutional 
norms; and a more ‗codified‘ approach, which provides far greater detail or 
specificity regarding the intended meaning and operation of relevant 
constitutional norms.‖55 
The determination of the approach to be followed in the drafting of a 
particular constitution does not depend upon the general volume or the number 
of articles incorporated in a constitution. This is because a given constitution 
may become bulky because of the numerous constitutional issues it addresses 
but not because of its details in each constitutional provision. Thus, to determine 
the approach adopted in the drafting of a constitution the extent to which the 
constitution has gone to detail in regulating a particular constitutional issue 
should be assessed. It is to be noted that the two approaches may be followed in 
a single constitution but on different subject matters. 
Before determining whether the drafting approach followed is framework-
style or ‗detailed,' it is necessary to highlight the core features of the framework 
                                           
54
 Since the Constitution separately regulates the issue of expropriation in the subsequent 
provision under Art. 40(8), this provision is intended to allow the government to terminate 
land rights based on other grounds to be determined by the legislature. For instance, the 
rural land laws of Ethiopia incorporate failure to use the land for specific period of time, 
failure to conserve the land, engagement in non-farming activities, and failure to observe 
residency requirement as a ground to deprive rural land rights of peasants and pastoralists. 
55
 Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin (2014), ―Towards an Alternative Theory of Constitutional 
Design‖, February 2, 2014 as cited in R. Dixon, supra note 4, p. 820. 
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style or detailed approaches. Indeed, it is not possible to find hard and fast rules 
in establishing these issues. As Dixon notes: 
[m]ore framework-like approaches will generally involve constitutional 
provisions in two forms: first, provisions that explicitly defer, or delegate, 
certain constitutional decisions to legislatures, via the use of language that 
requires certain constitutional questions to be settled ―by law‖ or by ordinary 
legislation; and second, provisions that are sufficiently vague or abstract in 
scope or meaning that they inevitably require some form of judicial 
interpretation. More codified approaches, in contrast, will generally involve 
provisions attempting to resolve, rather than defer or delegate, key 
constitutional questions.‖56 
One can argue that the existence of constitutional deferral by way of ‗by law‘ 
clause or vagueness in the provisions57 does not necessarily prove the adoption 
of the framework-style approach in drafting. This is because in constitutional 
provisions of different countries we find ‗by law‘ clauses or vague or abstract 
concepts in the form of constitutional deferral on the same subject matter. Such 
constitutional provisions may differ in the extent to which they regulate the 
matter.  
The rules on compensation upon expropriation of property are illustrative in 
the constitutions of Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Africa. In Uganda‘s and South 
Africa‘s constitutional provisions on expropriation, there are ‗by law‘ clauses; 
while the Ethiopian Constitution does not state any ‗by law‘ deferral other than 
stating an abstract/vague concept of commensurate compensation.58 In Uganda‘s 
Constitution, it is stated that the compulsory taking of possession or acquisition 
of property is made under a law which makes provision for prompt payment of 
fair and adequate compensation, prior to the taking of possession or acquisition 
of the property.59 Under the South African Constitution, it is provided that 
property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application 
…subject to compensation.60 The South African Constitution further deals with 
the factors to be considered in the determination of the amount of compensation. 
Unlike the Ugandan and Ethiopian Constitutions, it states that: 
                                           
56
 R. Dixon (2011), supra note 12. 
57
 For detail on the forms of Constitutional deferral, see Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg 
(2011), ―Deciding not to decide: Deferral in constitutional design‖, International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, Volume 9, Issue 3-4; pp. 636–672, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mor041 
58
  FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 40(8). 
59
 Ugandan Constitution, supra note 6, Article 26(2/b-i). 
60
 South African Constitution, supra note 7, Art. 25(2/b). 
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The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must 
be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public 
interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, including—  
(a) the current use of the property;  
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
(c) the market value of the property;  
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and  
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.61 
The South African Constitutional provision seems to have adopted the 
detailed approach in lawmaking, as compared to its Ugandan and Ethiopian 
counterparts. Yet, all of them provide for defer detail provisions by either using 
‗by law‘ clauses or by adopting a vague/abstract concept that requires definition 
through legislation. The approach adopted in the drafting of a given state‘s 
constitutional rules should thus be determined by comparing it with other states‘ 
constitutional rules on the same subject. 
Rosalind Dixon argues that the choice to adopt either a highly ―codified‖ or 
detailed approach to constitutional drafting or to rely on a more ―framework‖-
style approach, depends on the perception the constitution makers towards 
constitutional courts as partners in the process of constitutional interpretation. 
According to Dixon, ―the codified or the detailed approach implicitly assumes at 
least some degree of distrust toward judges as constitutional interpreters, 
whereas the framework‖-style approach is based on a high degree of faith or 
trust, in judges as partners in the process of constitutional design.‖62 
Dixon‘s observations do not explain the constitutional drafting approach 
adopted in the drafting of rural land rights clause and the nature of constitutional 
interpreter organ in Ethiopia. The first factor relates to the similarity and 
difference between constitutional provisions of countries that cannot be 
explained by Dixon‘s trust and distrust approaches in constitutional lawmaking. 
As highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, The South African Constitution 
adopts a detailed or codified approach in drafting provisions of compensation 
during expropriation of property in contrast to the Ethiopian and Ugandan 
Constitutions. Nevertheless, with regard to the issue of citizenship, the approach 
followed by the South African Constitution63 pursues a more of framework-style 
as compared to the Ethiopian64 and Ugandan Constitutions.65 
                                           
61
 Id at Art. 25(3) 
62
 R. Dixon, supra note 4, p. 820. 
63
 South African Constitution, supra note 7, Art. 3. The article entitles all citizens to equal 
rights, privileges and benefits subject to equal duties and responsibilities, and it totally 
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This change in the approach of drafting provisions of the constitution may 
lead to question why South African Constitution that adopts a distrust-based 
approach in drafting provision of compensation for expropriation adopts trust-
based approach regarding the issue of citizenship. Likewise, the Ugandan 
Constitution adopts a trust-based approach in drafting provision of 
compensation for expropriation and opts for a distrust-based approach in the 
case of rules of citizenship. Such variations occur in both constitutions even 
though the constitutional interpreter is the same body. We can thus conclude 
that the adoption of framework –style or detailed/codified approach of 
constitutional drafting does not necessarily depend on the perception of the 
constitutional makers towards the judges of constitutional interpretation.  
Second, the constitutional makers may follow a detailed/codified approach of 
drafting constitutional provisions even where they have a faith and trust on the 
constitutional interpreter. For example, the Ethiopian Constitution uses the 
detailed approach in drafting rural land rights even if all constitutional 
interpretation constitutional disputes are according to Articles 62(1) and 83(1) 
decided by a non-judicial organ, i.e. the House of Federation on which 
constitutional makers have faith and trust. 
The existence of this trust can be inferred from the justifications provided for 
assigning the power of constitutional interpretation to this organ at the time of 
the constitutional drafting. The justifications are twofold. The first one is related 
to the belief that the owner of the constitution should interpret it. Accordingly, 
the FDRE constitutional makers thought that the new federal dispensation is the 
outcome of the 'coming together' of the nationalities, and the FDRE Constitution 
is the reflection of their ‗free will and consent.‘ In fact, this is expressly 
reflected in the preamble and Article 8 of the FDRE Constitution while saying 
the ‗nations, nationalities and peoples are sovereign.‘ Then the constitutional 
makers considered the Constitution as ‗a political contract‘ and consequently, 
only the authors that are the nations, nationalities and peoples should be the ones 
to be vested with the power of interpreting the Constitution.66 To this effect, the 
                                                                                                            
defers to the national legislature to determine the manner of acquiring, losing and 
restoring of citizenship.  
64
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 6. The article defined the manner of acquiring 
Ethiopian nationality and how a foreign national can acquire Ethiopian nationality. 
65
 Ugandan Constitution, supra note 6, Art. 9 to19. The articles in detail regulate all issues 
revolving around citizenship.  
66
 Assefa Fiseha (2007), ―Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring the 
Experiences of the House of Federation‖, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.10; and also 
see K. I. Vibhute (2014), ―Non-Judicial Review in Ethiopia: Constitutional Paradigm, 
Premise and Precinct‖, Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L., Vol. 22, p.128. 
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constitutional interpreting organ –House of Federation– is composed of the 
representatives of the various nations, nationalities, and peoples.67 
The assignment of this power to the House of Federation is also related to the 
distrust (that the ruling party which controlled of majority votes among 
constitutional makers had) towards the judiciary. The FDRE constitutional 
makers perceived that empowering the judiciary, or a constitutional court may 
result in unnecessary ‗judicial adventurism‘ or what some prefer to call ‗judicial 
activism‘ in which the judges would in the process of interpreting vague clauses 
of the Constitution put their own preferences and policy choices in the first 
place. They believed that this in turn could hijack the very document that 
contains the ‗compact between the nations‘, ‗nationalities‘ and ‗peoples‘ thereby 
resulting in decisions that rather fit the personal philosophies of judges.68 
Therefore, this author argues that the reason for the adoption of the detailed 
rule regarding the rural land rights can be related with the debates and 
diversified views at the making of this clause69 and the level of sensitivity of the 
issue.70 The nature of the debate can be inferred from the very close voting made 
in the enactment of Article 40(3) of the Constitution by the constitutional 
assembly whereby 499 voted for the retention of state ownership of land, 
whereas 495 voting for privatization.  
In fact, the problem in the adoption of the codified/detailed approach in rural 
land rights relates to the incorporation of detail rules to regulated rural land 
rights in the Constitution which should have merely determined the nature of 
land ownership. The following section discusses the problems that emanate 
owing to such detail constitutional stipulations on rural land rights.   
5. Implications of the Constitutional Recognition of Rural Land 
Rights under FDRE Constitution  
The FDRE Constitution grants actual rights to rural land specifically contrary to 
the constitutions of other countries and international human rights instruments. 
As discussed above, Article 40 of the FDRE Constitution expressly grants the 
                                           
67
 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 61(1) and (2). 
68
 See supra note 66, A. Fiseha, p. 11 and K. I. Vibhute, p.128. 
69
 Gebru Mersha and M. Githinji (2005), Untying the Gordian Knot: The Question of Land 
Reform in Ethiopia, (ISS/UNDP Land, Poverty and Public Action Policy Paper No.9, The 
Hague: Institute of Social Studies).  
70
 As stated in the first section (paragraph 1) of this article the sensitivity of the land issue is 
noted by P. Brietzke, supra note 17, p. 638. and the preamble of  Proclamation No. 
31/1975). With regard to the ‗Land to Tiller‘ student movement that caused the downfall 
of the  last emperor, see, for example, Daniel Weldegebriel  (2012), ―Land Rights in 
Ethiopia: Ownership, equity, and liberty in land use rights‖, (FIG Working Week Rome, 
Italy, 6-10 May 2012) p .4.  
 
Trust and Distrust Approaches in the Constitutional Lawmaking of Rural Land rights in Ethiopia   367 
 
 
Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists with free access to rural land and while 
private investors are accorded the right based on payment arrangements. The 
Constitution further also ensures peasants and pastoralists with the right to 
protection against eviction and displacement. Moreover, the Constitution defines 
the nature of property rights in land. The level of details in the constitutional 
recognition of rural land rights will have its implications on the restriction of 
legislative power and the obligation of the government to realize the land rights.  
The first challenge that is created by level of details in the Constitution 
relates to the obligation of the government to ensure the implementation of the 
constitutional rights of peasants and pastoralists for access to land without 
payment. To this end, Article 13(1) of the Constitution imposes a duty on the 
government to enforce the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied therein 
including access to rural land rights enshrined Articles 40(4) and 40(5).  
The second implication of the detailed approach in the constitutional 
recognition of rural land rights in the FDRE Constitution is related with the 
nature of land policy that need to be flexible so that it can be responsive to 
changing realities. This creates rigidity on the land regime owing to the stringent 
procedures in the amendment of constitutions. The details in the constitutional 
recognition of rural land rights in the FDRE Constitution indeed imply 
restrictions against the legislative power of the legislature.71 While regulating 
the issues of rural land rights under the human rights section, the FDRE 
Constitution defines the rural land policy of the country. This situation 
effectively eliminates the possibility of flexible application of policy.72 The legal 
framework for land rights should not only be comprehensive, but should also be 
flexible, allowing for different options depending on population density, the 
level of economic development, and infrastructure access.73  
Accordingly, the Ethiopian rural land regime expressed in the Constitution is 
inflexible to be compatible with the changing socio-economic lives of the 
society. This is because the modification of the rural land policy of the country 
needs the amendment of the Constitution which has stringent amendment 
procedures. Article 40 of  which embodies the rights on land is classified under 
the human and democratic rights section which has a more stringent procedure 
                                           
71
 Not to enact contradictory rules in enacting legislation. This is because under article 9(1) 
of the FDRE Constitution it is provided the self-supremacy clause – supremacy of the 
constitution and declared that any law…of an organ of state…which contravenes the 
constitution shall be of no effect. 
72
 S. Gebreselassie, supra note 16, p. 4.  
73
 See Klaus Deininger (2003), Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, The 
World Bank, Washington DC, p. 51. 
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for amendment.74 Moreover, the inflexibility of the provisions is aggravated by 
the absence of commitment to that effect from the side of the ruling party which 
has the lion share of seats in the State Councils of the federative units and the 
two federal Houses (the House People‘s Representatives and the House of 
Federation) which are empowered to amend the constitution jointly.75 This was 
clearlly expressed by late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi during his end-of-year 
report to Parliament in June 2004 when he the announced that the change of 
land policy in Ethiopia would take place only ―over his party‘s –Ethiopian 
People‘s Democratic Revolutionary Front‘s– tombstone‖.76 
The final important implication is that the constitutional recognition of rural 
land rights in the Constitution will lead to the ramification of the question of the 
constitutionality of the rural land legislation in regulating the rural land rights. 
For example, the rural land legislation (with an exception to Amhara State‘s 
Rural Land law) prohibits peasants from using their land rights as collateral.77 
As immovable property, land is often the best form of security for a loan. A 
landholder may grant an interest in his land as security (known as a mortgage) in 
favor of a person in return for a loan.78 Access to credit is often a critical 
question in rural areas which requires land to be used as collateral.79 As De Soto 
notes, land tenure could unlock the entrepreneurship of poor people by letting 
them use their real estate assets (including land rights) as collateral to borrow 
investment capital.80 
Contrary to such crucial importance of land rights, the rural land legislation 
in Ethiopia even impliedly prohibits peasants from using their land rights as 
collateral to access loan. This can be inferred from the definition given to the 
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 FDRE Constitution, supra note 8, Art. 105(1) 
75
 Since the adoption of the FDRE Constitution in 1995, the seats in all State councils of the 
federations and the two federal houses have been by dominated by the ruling party, 
Ethiopian People‘s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF).  
76
 Stephen Devereux et al (2005), ―Too Much Inequality or Too Little? Inequality and 
Stagnation in Ethiopian‖, Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, Vol. 36, No. 2, p.122. 
However, with the coming into power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed there is a 
possibility of change of the ruling party‘s rigid position on the land regime.  
77
 The 2018 Amhara State‘s Rural Land Law authorizes the peasants to use their land rights 
as collateral to secure loan. This stipulation also raises the question whether Regional 
States in Ethiopia have the power to delineate the property rights in land.  
78
 SH Goo (2002), Sourcebook on Land Law, (3
rd
ed), Cavendish Publishing Ltd, p. 813. 
79
 Paul De Wit et al ―2009‖, Land Policy Development in an African Context: Lessons 
Learned from Selected Experiences, FAO Land Tenure Working Paper 14, p. 63. 
80
 Hernando De Soto (2000), The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West 
and fails everywhere else, Black Swan, New York.  See also Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-
Hung Hong (eds) (2009), Property Rights and Land Policies, (Proceedings of the 2008 
Land Policy Conference) p. xi. 
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property rights in land of peasants and from the provision of the rural land 
legislation that allow mortgaging to investors expressly.81 The rationale that is 
stated by the Ethiopian government is that the sale, mortgage, or use of land as 
collateral is expressly prohibited to prevent the development of exploitative 
land arrangements.82 
Since rights should be interpreted broadly and limitation should be 
constructed restrictively,83 it can be argued that this prohibition is 
unconstitutional. If it is argued that the Constitution does not allow rural land 
right holders to mortgage their land rights based on the prohibition of sale and 
exchange (stated under Article 40/3), then the express authorization of private 
investors84 and also urban land right holders85 to use their land rights as 
collateral will be unconstitutional. It is to be noted that Article 40(3) of the 
Constitution refers to all landholders including investors and urban landholders. 
Thus, either way, it raises the question of constitutionality. 
Concluding Remarks  
A detailed recognition of the rural land rights –more than stating the nature of 
land ownership and regulating it under the general property rights– in the FDRE 
Constitution, has resulted in an inflexible land regime which is not responsive to 
the change of circumstances. This is susceptible to persistent and continued 
demand from peasants and pastoralists for the realization of their right to free 
allotment of land, which cannot be achieved owing to the limited nature of the 
land and Ethiopia‘s steadily increasing population. As land is inelastic, the 
government cannot continue providing land to peasants and pastoralists 
particularly in light of the rate of population growth and Ethiopia‘s slow pace in  
industrialization, import substitution and export enhancement that could have 
reduced the economy‘s substantial reliance on smallholder rural land cultivation.  
Moreover, detailed statements of constitutional rights on land limit the power 
of the government to define the property rights in land. The paradox in this 
regard is that such detail constitutional lawmaking against eviction and 
dispossession of peasants and pastoralists has not inhibited the enactment of 
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 See Proclamation No. 456/2005, Art. 2(4) and Art. 8(4). 
82
 See for instance, PJ. Bodurtha, Peter J. et al, supra note 33, p. 6; D. Rahmato, supra notes 
34, pp. iii and 14; Stefan Decron and Daniel Ayalew (2007), ―Land Rights, Powers and 
Trees in Rural Ethiopia‖, CSAE WPS/2007-07, p.6; Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2003), Rural Development Policy and Strategies,p.24. 
83
 Francis G. MorriseyOmi (2012),―Strict interpretation helps avoid Harshness‖‘ Health 
Progress. 
84
 See Proclamation No. 456/2005, Art. 8(4). 
85
 See the Federal Urban Lands Lease Proclamation No.721/2011, Art. 24(1). 
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unconstitutional proclamations that embody absurd and extensive land 
expropriation powers of the government. These realities lead to the questionable 
constitutionality of the subsequent rural land legislation and the acts of the 
government. 
The constitutional drafting approach adopted in the rural land rights clause of 
the FDRE Constitution is not compatible with Dixon‘s trust approach. Given 
that the constitutional interpreter in Ethiopia –House of Federation– is the organ 
composed of representatives of the (assumed to be) authors of the Constitution – 
nationalities, the drafters would have followed ‗framework-style‘ approach. 
However, this state of affairs casts doubt on the validity of the premises in of 
Dixon‘s view that relates constitutional drafting approaches with the perception 
of constitutional makers towards the constitutional interpreter. In her view, 
constitutional drafters follow a framework-style constitutional drafting approach 
when they trust and regard the constitutional interpreter as a partner in the 
constitutional designing. The detailed or codified approach is adopted in case 
the drafters distrust the constitutional interpreter. She also defines the adoption 
of a particular constitutional drafting approach based on the presence or absence 
of ‗by law‘ deferrals and vague and abstract concepts in the Constitution.  
I argue that determining the constitutional drafting approach adopted by 
constitutional makers cannot only be determined by looking into the existence 
or nonexistence of ‗by-law‘ deferral or vague concepts. It should rather be 
complemented with the comparative analysis of the constitutional laws of 
different states on the same subject matters. Furthermore, the adoption of one of 
the approaches may not be justified only on the trust-distrust dichotomy of the 
constitutional interpreter. This is because in a given constitution, which is 
subjected to a single interpreter organ, it is possible to find both drafting 
approaches in different constitutional matters. Moreover, even in the presence of 
a trusted constitutional interpreter, the detailed approach of a constitutional 
clause may be adopted as in the case of rural land rights provision of FDRE 
Constitution. 
Therefore, determination of the constitutional drafting approach followed by 
a given constitutional drafter should be issue-specific. It should be done by 
analyzing specific constitutional matters and comparing the existence and 
nonexistence of constitutional deferral among constitutional laws of different 
countries. Furthermore, the selection of the approach may not be solely affected 
by the perception of constitutional drafters towards constitutional interpreters. It, 
rather, may be influenced by the extent of diversity of views and debates on the 
issues and by the level of sensitivity of the issue.                                                ■ 
